As Telford (1992) points out, the multifarious character of the Sikh community in the rural and urban contexts has presented opportunities over time for leaders and political interests both to attempt to consolidate Sikh identity and to contest it from within, highlighting various social cleavages and structural reasons behind the tensions between regional Punjabi/Sikh aspirations and the overly centralised Indian politico-economic system. It is likely that these tensions will keep on contributing to divergent portrayals of Bhindranwale who is seen both by his supporters as well as opponents as the most inspirational figure behind regional Sikh aspirations. These aspirations also have a role to play in tensions which have India's total population (Govt. of Punjab, 2008:94-95) . This duality of Sikh locationa minority in India but a majority in Punjab-remains a continuing source of political conflict and tension between Sikh majority Punjab and Hindu majority India. 
Green Revolution, Capitalist Modernisation and Bhindranwale's Social Reformism
The Green Revolution strategy of agricultural development in the 1960s led to the extension and deepening of the capitalist mode of production in Punjab agriculture. 4 The commodification of social life as a consequence of increasing capitalist modernization in Punjab's rural society resulted in several forms of fissures in social practices and cultural norms. In response to this socio-cultural crisis, various ideological currents emerged with two in particular dominating the discourse on social change in relation to economic development: a radical Marxism-inspired vision of an alternative collectivist socialist life and a religious revivalist vision of a 'pure' Sikh way of life. These two visions, which had been engaged with one another for decades, became increasingly exclusive of one another during this time. The radical vision became especially more popular with
Sikh students in the universities and the professional medical and engineering colleges. Many of these students were the first generation of their rural families to brutal state terror by the mid-1970s (Judge, 1992) , its intellectual and political legacy did leave some impact on Punjab's political culture.
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The egalitarianism derived from the Marxist tradition coexisted with that of the Sikh tradition. This coexistence on one hand radicalized the intellectual vocabulary of the Punjabi Sikh intelligentsia and on the other contributed to strengthening Sikh identity with egalitarianism lying at its centre. Maoist internationalism, by weakening the ideological appeal of Indian nationalism among the Punjabi Sikh intelligentsia, made its own indirect contribution to the strengthening of a separate Sikh identity. It is not surprising, therefore, that later on some activists from the Naxalite tradition either joined or aligned with a section of the Sikh militants who campaigned for a separate Sikh homeland of Khalistan.
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The collapse of the Naxalite movement in the early/mid-1970s was followed by the emergence of religious revivalist currents, though there is no direct causal link between the two. The indirect link, however, points to the political vacuum created (Singh, 1987: 169) . The religious revivalist groups found a responsive audience among the rural Sikh population when they launched a moral and ideological crusade against this degenerative form of capitalist modernization.
Though many organizations and individuals played a crucial role in the Sikh revivalist movement, it was Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale who, after becoming the head of the Sikh seminary Damdami Taksal on August 17, 1975 (D. Singh, 2003 Darshi, 2006:32; G. Singh and S. Singh, 2005: 130) , came to occupy the central role and eventually to symbolize the Sikh revivalist movement. 7 His movement went through a number of phases: first, a moral, humanist and egalitarian phase when he focused on preaching against vulgar consumerism and casteism (Singh, 1987: 170-171) ; second, a Sikh 'orthodoxy' phase during which he collided with a 'heterodox' sect called the Nirankaris in 1978 in Amritsar when over a dozen Sikhs were killed in a Sikh-Nirankari clash (Grewal, 1998: 216; Dhillon, 1992: 143) ; third, an anti-Hindu phase when he directed his tirade against an urban-based Hindu press baron, Jagat Narain, who had supported the Nirankari campaign against the Sikhs (Deol, 2000, chapter 6 ) and finally his insistence that the central government must accept the provisions of the Anandpur Sahib 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Sandhu, 1999: 476-77) . It was in the last two stages that he started to become portrayed in the urban-based Indian media as anti-Hindu and anti-centre.
The capitalist modernisation of Punjab's agriculture in the mid-sixties compressed into a very short time-span the enormous changes taking place at the level of economy, society and culture. 8 The techniques of production were revolutionised, social relations were restructured, and the social cultural ethos was altered. While there was an increase in agricultural output, the benefits of the green revolution were not experienced proportionately or evenly (Telford, 1992 Judge (2004) The underpinnings and valorization of this masculine identity emphasised the patriarchal family structure and bolstered masculinity as a force to be bridled (Axel, 2001) . While the cultivation of Jat Sikh masculinity, in particular, was one outcome of Bhindranwale's appeal in utilizing the patriarchal base of society, the emerging new post-1984 Khalsa identity came to take on new forms of transmission of masculinity and identity through militancy and flows of out-migration. Chopra Bhindranwale seemed to be gathering more support among the Sikh masses for advocating that the use of violence was more likely to lead to achieving the goals of the Sikh struggle than the path of peaceful agitation promoted by the moderate tendency. The espousal of violence by Bhindranwale attracted the wrath of the state's security agencies leading to stepping up their attacks against Bhindranwale supporters. Some of Bhindranwale's followers were killed in police custody and were reported by the police to have been killed in encounters. Such 'encounters', which came to be known in the media as 'fake encounters', increased in number. Singh, 2005) . In between these commemorative readings and interpretations of Bhindranwale after his death, however, there appeared to be a consensus (at least publically) that while
Bhindranwale may have represented a just cause, the creation of a separate Sikh state was not feasible and that amends needed to be made with the Indian state. It is this consensus and a widely shared desire for peace and an end to violence Criticisms of the state and the media's role in projecting a largely pro-national Indian stance were accentuated by such international attention bolstered by a vocal Sikh diaspora placing pressures both 'within' and 'without' Indian territorial boundaries (Axel, 2001) . The panopticon role of the Indian state line on antimilitancy during the 1980s up to the mid-1990s began to show cracks by the interventions of extra-national agencies and a growing public discontentment in Punjab and amongst its diaspora due to the lack of official acknowledgement or justice served for the state-sponsored human rights abuses which had taken place. analyses had been previously silenced about the anti-Sikh 'riots' which followed the assassination of Indira Gandhi was part of a wider phenomena of state Gandhi. The Nanavati Commission's central findings were that there had been strong currents of complicity within state agencies in aiding the obstruction of justice in the cases of 1984, many of which were never filed or were filed in retrospect many years later, which needed to now be addressed.
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For our purposes here, it is important to note that the corruption and complicity that existed around the violence and lack of justice was exposed through the opening up of access to information enabled by the new media since the mid-1990s.
However, one must not simply view the media as a monolithic or unified entity or voice. Even the mediums vary, with information technologies entering into the picture as a serious force within social access to information. The Nanavati Commission report, for instance, was available immediately after its release online, 
Bhindranwale in the Market: A Subliminal Resurgence?
The recent visibility and consumption of Bhindranwale's image through items available for sale in bazaar stalls and shops needs to be understood in the backdrop of this history of capitalist development in the region, state repression and a collective consciousness of injustice. It is within this context that the bazaar economy provides a market for the consumption of his symbol within an 'economy of signs' (Lash and Urry, 1994) through which people's sentiments of political currents in the region, which could not be expressed otherwise through other mediums, can be produced, sold and purchased.
During the early 1990s images of Bhindranwale had been retracted into private spaces, largely out of people's fears of being targeted or branded by the police as militants or sympathisers. He continued to signify a symbol of solidarity either with the grievances felt by many against the Indian state for its treatment of the Sikhs or for the more extreme sentiments of those hoping for the establishment of a separate Sikh homeland Khalistan. However, the private nature of displaying this defiant symbol meant that these sentiments remained outside of the public space. However, this discourse was neither addressing the earlier grievances symbolised by Bhindranwale nor was it in tune with the popular sentiments critical of corruption and power politics. The attempts to generate a collective amnesia about
Bhindranwale by the state forces could be said to have been unsuccessful. While wiping out militancy and militants, the image and sentiments remained a part of the history, social memory and psyche of the place. Thus, while the public space had become dominated by the display of order and control, in a Foucauldian sense, through a heavy-handed enforcement of this by both police and political forces, civil society continued to hold the memory of the previous decades, which, we might say has become crystallised in the Bhindranwale images which are now in circulation.
While one avenue to voice opposition is militancy and armed struggle, another is electorally through the vote. However, the polarised partisan set-up in Punjab between the Congress and Akali parties needs to be acknowledged for generating a sense of alienation and a lack of any real choice within mainstream politics in contemporary Punjab. Alongside this, the form of regulation by the state has changed and the proliferation of information technologies has taken place, making the ability to express one's preferences less constricted, which presents a contradictory effect. While appearing in a subliminally silent but visible manner, Bhindranwale's image has become a reminder of the history of repression and resistance. It is around 2008 when the previous privately displayed images of This could be seen less as a resurgence of the politics represented by
Bhindranwale and more as a desire to highlight the unaddressed grievances and disdain for the current political order which appears more concerned with building power bases and alliances than in being accountable to the society it governs. The public displaying of Bhindranwale imagery offers a new mode for a politics of resistance through a visual voicing of a politics of opposition to the current order. (Lash and Urry, 1994) through which local desires and demands for alternative ways of viewing the region beyond its fraught history are being articulated. They are also, as Urry (1995) defines, markers of the 'economic base of place' in allowing for a place such as Punjab to 'consume one's identity' through these signs (Lash and Urry, 1994) . Axel employs the notion of fantasy in critiquing 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The surge in demand for Bhindranwale paraphernalia is aptly spoken for through the messages on the items such as "I will have to make a comeback" as a symbol of more than just commodified identity politics. The widespread availability and range of items as one comes across the stickers in market stalls, on billboards or on passing cars' rear windows is striking. Indeed, as this article goes on to explain, the demand for Bhindranwale items has been met by supplying Chinese manufacturers aware of the growth potential in this market who have undercut the prices of Indian-made goods. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The buses which are run by the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Subramaniam 1979 , Bhalla and Chadha 1982 , Bhalla et al 1990 and Chadha 1986 For understanding the nature of the Marxist influence in Punjab, see Singh 1985b Singh , 1997 Singh and 2002 Three studies of the pre-Naxalite communist movement in Punjab are: Josh (1979) , Singh (1994) and Sharma (2009) . All the studies of Marxism and communism in Punjab bring out the significance of the rural dimension of Punjabi communism. 6 The argument of Ajmer Singh (1992) is an example of a transition from a Maoist/Naxalite perspective to that of Sikh militancy. 7 Akhand Kirtani Jatha was one such very well known organisation. See Barrow (2001) for a detailed study of this organization. 8 Azad (ed) (1983), Singh (2008) , and Ghuman et al (eds.) (2010) cover major aspects of the changes taking place in the Punjab economy and their socio-cultural consequences and political implications.
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